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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis analyzes Variable Interest Entities in China, including why they exist, how 
they are used, why they are a problem, and some possible solutions that can be used to resolve 
the situation in the future. To accomplish this goal, this thesis begins by examining the historical 
background associated with foreign direct investment in China, followed by a discussion of the 
various regulatory issues caused by VIEs. Next, this thesis paper will compare the foreign 
investment law of the U.S. with the foreign investment law of China as a means of providing 
context. 
 This thesis will then look at some concrete examples of theses issues by going over six 
different real world case studies. Lastly, this thesis paper will examine some possible solutions to 
the problems caused by VIEs, including a discussion of the possible impact the New Draft 
Foreign Investment Law could have on the necessity of employing VIE structures to invest in 
Chinese companies which operate in sensitive industries. 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Variable Interest Entity; Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
! 4!
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION.....……………………………………………………………………………..4 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND……………….......…………………………………….4 
A. History of Foreign Investment in China…………………………………………………..5 
B.  History of the VIE……………………………………………………………………...….7 
C.  Anatomy of a VIE………………………………………………………………………..18 
II.  REGULATORY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH VIES…………………………...……20 
A. VIE Warnings……………………………………………………………………………21 
B. History of VIE Regulation………………………………………………………….……24 
1. Foreign Exchange Control Rules in 2005……………………………………………….24 
2. Mergers and Acquisitions Rules in 2006...........................................................................25 
3. Tax Notice 82 in 2009........................................................................................................26 
4. Online Game Rules in 2009...............................................................................................26 
5. PBOC Measures on Online Payment Services in 2010.....................................................27 
III. UNITED STATES FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW………………………………..…27 
IV. CASE STUDIES…………………………………...…………………………………….39 
A. Yahoo/Alibaba………………………………………………………………………..….39 
B.  Buddha Steel………………………………………………………………………..……42 
C.  GigaMedia…………………………………………………………………………….…44 
D.  New Oriental Education………………………………………………………………….46   
E.  Chinachem…………………………………………………………………………….....48 
F.  FAB Universal…………………………………………………………………………...49 
V. VIE RISK ISSUES………………………………………………………………………50 
A.  Risks Associated With VIEs……………………………………………………………..50 
1.  Legal and Regulatory Risks……………………………………………………………...51 
2.  Shareholder Misappropriation Risks………………...……………………………..……52 
3.  Operational Risks……………………………………………………………………...…54 
B. Mitigating the Risks of VIEs………………………………………………………….…57 
1.  Diversify Shareholding of the VIE……………………………………………………….57 
2.  Carefully Consider Board Composition and Legal Representative……………………..57 
3.  Align Interests Between The VIE And The Offshore Holding Company…………….…..58 
4.  Ensure The VIE Contract Agreements Are Enforceable…………………………………58 
5.  Explore Collapsing The VIE And Revert To A Traditional Parent Subsidiary………….59 
VI. POSSIBLE VIE SOLUTIONS…………………………………………………………..60 
A. Regulatory Action to Abate Risk………………………………………………………...60 
B.  Multiple Share Structure………………………………………………………………...61!
C.  Allow Chinese Companies to Directly List Abroad……………………………………..62 
D.  Bilateral Investment Treaty……………………………………………………………...63 
VII. CHINA’S NEW DRAFT FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW……………………...…….69 
A.  New Foreign Investment Law Background……………………………………………..69 
B.  Policy Implications of the New Foreign Investment Law……………………………....75 
1.  Implications For Foreign Investors…………………...……………………………...…76 
2.  Implications for Chinese Private Enterprises………………………………...………....77!
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..79 
 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
! 5!
INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis will examine the Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”), which is an investment 
structure that must be used by foreign investors who wish to invest in Chinese companies that 
operate in certain sensitive industries. The VIE structure has come about as a result of the 
interplay of the foreign direct investment regulatory schemes of China and the United States, 
which is why the regulatory schemes of both China and the United States will be discussed. 
Since the regulatory schemes employed by the United States and China were unable to work 
together to satisfy the goals of both countries, the VIE structure filled the gap by allowing both 
countries to turn a blind eye to the fact that many of their regulations were being followed 
according to the letter of the law, but not according to the sprit of the law. 
 Permitting Chinese companies to adopt VIE structures allows the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”) to simultaneously achieve competing objectives. On the one hand, the PRC 
desires to prohibit foreign ownership of business entities operating in industries that the PRC has 
decided are sensitive, which includes industries such as the Internet, value-added 
telecommunications, and energy. The PRC designates these industries as sensitive because 
foreign ownership could compromise national security. On the other hand, China’s capital 
markets, while improving, are relatively young have not achieved an adequate level of 
development to support the needs of China’s biggest and fastest-growing companies. The PRC, 
therefore, wants their corporations to be able to access foreign financing, despite the fact that 
these corporations operate in a sensitive industry, which means it is illegal for these corporations 
to seek foreign investment.  
 Many of China’s biggest companies, including Alibaba, Sina, Baidu, and Tudou use the 
VIE structure to allow them to hold initial public offerings and list on foreign exchanges, despite 
the fact that they are all Internet companies, and therefore not allowed to seek foreign financing. 
The regulations which force these private companies to adopt the VIE structure do not apply to 
China’s state-owned enterprises (“SOE”), which allows Chinese SOEs to directly list on foreign 
exchanges without using the VIE structure. The VIE structure allows private Chinese companies 
who operate in sensitive industries to list on foreign exchanges because the listed entity is 
usually domiciled in the Cayman Islands, and a web of contracts allows the offshore listed 
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corporation to have an interest in all of the profits of the original Chinese corporation operating 
in a sensitive industry. The foreign investors in the offshore listed corporation, therefore, do not 
directly own any part of the original mainland corporation, which is the entity actually operating 
the business. What foreign investors in the offshore listed corporation actually own is an interest 
in a corporation owning a contractual right to receive the profits of the Chinese company 
operating in a sensitive industry.   
 This situation creates a great deal of risk for the investors because they own no interest in 
any of the actual assets of the business. If a listed corporation goes out of business the 
shareholders would normally have a proportionate interest in the assets of the business when the 
assets are liquidated at auction. A shareholder in the offshore listed part of a VIE structure, 
however, would have no similar right if the Chinese company goes out of business because the 
shareholders own no equity interest in the actual entity operating the business.  
 Further, the web of contracts which forms the backbone of the VIE structure stands on 
legal footing that is tenuous at best. Chinese courts have invalidated VIE contracts in the past for 
frustrating public policy. VIE contracts have also been invalidated in Chinese courts for violating 
Chinese contract law by concealing an illegal objective. Since it is illegal for these corporations 
to seek foreign investment, the fact that VIE contracts conceal an illegal objective can hardly be 
questioned. Foreign investors, therefore, have no recourse in Chinese courts to enforce VIE 
contracts because the contracts will likely be held invalid in court. Since all foreign investors 
actually own is a contractual right to profits, and those contracts which grant the right likely 
cannot be enforced in Chinese courts, there is a great deal of risk for foreigners who invest in 
these entities.  
 With all this risk, there must be a great deal of potential reward for shareholders to want 
to invest in Chinese corporations that use a VIE structure. In recent decades China has been one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world and investors are eager to have holdings in one of 
the only growth economies in the world. VIE investors have indeed been rewarded in some cases 
for their willingness to expose themselves to risk. Chinese corporations such as Alibaba have 
held some of the biggest IPOs in history, which have resulted in huge profits to investors. As an 
illustration of how important some VIE investments are, most of the value in Yahoo’s stock is 
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due to the fact that Yahoo owns a large part of Alibaba, which is a case that will be explored 
more fully later in this paper. 
 To provide context for how these entities operate in the real world, multiple real Chinese 
cases involving VIE structures will be discussed in this paper, followed by a discussion of some 
of the risks associated with operating a company that uses a VIE structure. Finally, this thesis 
paper will provide some potential theories for improving the VIE situation, including a 
discussion of what development could finally be responsible for finally rendering the VIE 
investment structure obsolete. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The ability to exclude foreign individuals and property has always been an aspect of 
nationhood respected by the international community. In most situations, nations do not choose 
to exclude all people or property from an individual country. Each individual country needs to 
consider its own interests and objectives when crafting its own policies regarding which people 
and property will be excluded. Policies exist somewhere on a spectrum, from very liberally 
allowing most people and property to cross national borders to being very restrictive and 
isolationist.  
 Restrictions on foreign investment have been written into national domestic laws all the 
way back to the Magna Carta and that tradition continues in the contemporary international 
foreign investment structure. Like all developed nations, both China and the United States have 
taken action to limit foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in their respective nations in order to 
bolster national defense. There are certain industries in all countries that foreigners are not 
allowed to directly invest in. The first section of this paper will first examine the history of 
foreign investment in China, followed by a discussion of the history of the VIE. Lastly, this 
section will send with a description of how a typical VIE is structured. 
A. History of Foreign Investment in China 
 No country has more drastically changed its position on foreign investment over the past 
few decades than China. This drastic change in foreign investment policies has been 
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accompanied by economic development at breakneck speed. The evolution of Chinese foreign 
investment policy over the past few decades has provided a fascinating case study of how much 
loosening trading restrictions can stimulate economic growth. 
 The PRC currently operates in a self-defined “socialist market economy” and is governed 
by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). Throughout the Maoist era (1949-1978), foreign 
direct investment in China was almost non-existent and historically, the anti-commercial 
traditions underlying Confucian ideology dominated, which meant merchants were assigned low 
social status.1 More recently, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China was 
exploited and colonized by Western militaries and forced to trade.2 Consequently, China felt 
intense hostility toward the West, as well as a strong desire to recuperate autonomy over its trade 
and commerce sectors.3  
 In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) ascended to power and established the 
PRC.4 Shortly after the CCP took power, the Chinese economy retreated into a strict form of 
socialism that eliminated the private-sector economy.5 The new government put virtually all 
economic activity under state control and foreign investment was prohibited.6 
 In 1978 the new CCP leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, instigated a groundbreaking new 
“Open Door” policy with a view to commencing necessary economic reforms.7 These reforms 
produced a surge in economic growth that propelled the Chinese gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) to a remarkable average growth rate of over nine percent that persisted from the late !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 X. Zhang, Historical Attitudes and Implications for Path Dependence: FDI Development and 
Institutional Changes in China, 11 (2004) Erim. Rep. Series Res. In MGMT. 
2 G. Finch, Modern Chinese Constitutionalism: Reflections of Economic Change, 77 (2007) 
Williamette J. INT’L.L.& DISP. RESOL. 
3 A. Berger, The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making Program in ‘The Politics of 
International Economics Law (Tomer Broude, 2011). 
4 S. Lawrence & M. Martin, Understanding China’s Political System, 1 (2013) Cong. Research 
Serv., R41007. 
5 S. Shi, Comment, Dragon’s House of Cards: Perils of Investing in Variable Interest Entities 
Domiciled in the People’s Republic of China and Listed in the United States, 37 Fordham Int’l 
L.J. 1265, 1270–71 (2014). 
6 Id. 
7 A. E. Csordas, Funding Entrepreneurial Ventures in China: Proposals to More Effectively 
Regulate Chinese Foreign Private Issuers, 373 (2012) 38 Brook. J. Int’l. L., 373. 
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1980s through the early 2000s.1 Huge amounts of foreign investment naturally followed these 
reforms since similar growth rates could not be found anywhere else in the world.2 The speed 
with which change occurred during this period in China is likely unparalleled elsewhere in world 
history.  
 When foreign investment in China began in the early 1980s, China had no existing legal 
structure to govern most commercial activity, including foreign investment.3 The institutions and 
laws required to create a new economic regime from scratch were implemented in a piecemeal 
fashion, rather than as a coherent whole, by bureaucrats who had no experience with free 
markets.4 One result of this irregular process was that foreign-related businesses were situated in 
an entirely separate legal framework, divorced from ordinary Chinese corporate law.5 As a result 
of this segregated treatment, foreign-related businesses and investments are subject to overview 
by dedicated agencies, the most important of which is the Ministry of Commerce 
(“MOFCOM”).6 
 These reforms were introduced with the intention of utilizing “market mechanisms and 
foreign resources” in order to stimulate economic growth.7 For example, by the 1990s, economic 
reforms had accelerated to the point where the “conventional state planning system” was 
transformed into “a more market-oriented macroeconomic regulation and control regime.”8 
However, despite the new leaders of the CCP in the post-Mao era developing enduring and 
substantial policy alterations for economic reform, they did not go as far as to broadly reverse the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 B. Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, 140 (2007). 
2 N. Lardy, China in the World Economy, 64 (1994). 
3 S. Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 (2006) COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 7-11. 4!Id. at 8, 11. 
5 J. Chen, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation, 475 (2008). 
6 D. Schindelheim, Variable Interest Entity Structures in the People’s Republic of China: Is 
Uncertainty for Foreign Investors Part of China’s Economic Development Plan? 21 Cardozo J. 
INT’L & COMP. L., 199-200 (2012). 
7 W. I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China’s 
Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 Brook. J. INT’L. L., 477 (2002). 
8 S. Wei, Dark Past, Grey Present or Bright Future? Foreign Investors’ Access to China’s 
Telecommunications Industry and a Political Economy Analysis of Recent Industrial Policy 
Moves, J. World Inv. & Trade, 513 (2012). 
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objectives promulgated during the previous era.1 In spite of progressive changes in policy, 
protectionist attitudes persisted in the shape of regulatory restrictions of investments from 
outside China throughout a number of different industries.2 The contrasting treatment of Chinese 
and non-Chinese investments has proved to be a longstanding policy instituted by the CCP and is 
viewed as likely to persist into the foreseeable future.3 It must be pointed out, however, that 
treating foreign investments differently than domestic investments is certainly not unique to 
China. When the United States foreign investment regulatory structure is discussed later in this 
paper we will see that the United States also has a history of regulating foreign investment 
differently than domestic investments in certain industries. 
 Furthermore, it is believed by some that the CCP may be considering a return to a more 
protectionist regime, propelled by a growing sense of nationalist pride and a drive to retain 
homegrown Chinese companies under governmental control.4 This sense has heightened anxiety 
among investors who fear that the PRC may be waiting until domestic capital markets are 
developed enough to crack down on VIE structures and compel these huge domestic 
corporations to list on domestic Chinese exchanges. The PRC could just be tolerating use of 
VIEs while foreign capital is still needed, waiting to fully enforce domestic law until there is 
enough access to capital in China. The fact that such huge sums of money are invested in 
corporations utilizing VIEs makes it unlikely, however, that any abrupt action will be taken to 
crack down on the structure because such extreme measures would likely result in serious 
economic consequences. 
B.  History of the VIE 
 Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”) is a term that was originally coined by the United States 
Financial Accounting Standards Board in FIN 46 to refer to an entity in which the investor holds 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 D. Schindelheim, supra p. 8. 
2 S. Wei, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? Placing (or Misplacing) 
Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 H.K.L.J., 561 (2012). 
3 H. Huang, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: A Political Economy 
Analysis, 23 COLUM. J. Asian L., 185 (2009). 
4 V. Bath, Foreign Investment, the National Interest and National Security- Foreign Direct 
Investment in Australia and China, 34 Sydney L. REV., 32 (2012). 
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a controlling interest that is not based on the majority of voting rights.1 The importance of 
identifying a VIE is that a company needs to consolidate such entities in its financial statements 
if it is the primary beneficiary of the VIE.2 
 The VIE is a widely utilized investment structure employed throughout the foreign 
investment sector in China.3 The structure involves a variety of contractual arrangements that 
hold the principal function of circumventing the investment restrictions that the Chinese 
government has placed upon foreign ownership in particular sectors of the market.4 
Consequently, the legal validity of VIEs has been a point of contention since its very inception. 
The VIE structure consists of several corporate entities linked together through a mix of 
contractual relationships and equity ownership for the purpose of convincing shareholders of an 
offshore company that they own interest in the Chinese operating business, while simultaneously 
appearing to the Chinese government as though no illegal foreign ownership of the operating 
company exists.5 This scheme is designed to circumvent Chinese law, and is therefore a means to 
an illegal end.6 
 The Chinese authorities have generally tacitly approved use of the VIE structure. 
Consequently, the VIE structure has been broadly implemented throughout foreign investment in 
China.7 This adoption has aided, among other things, a number of the most renowned Chinese 
enterprises by facilitating their acquirement of foreign capital and finalizing offshore listings, 
notwithstanding the legal restrictions. Some of the well-known Chinese companies utilizing the 
VIE structure include Baidu, Sina Corp., Sohu.com, Netease, Tencent, Renren, Dangdang, New 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 What is VIE Issue Surrounding New Oriental?, China.org.cn (2012) 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-07/31/content_26075616.htm. 
2 Id. 
3 Z. Xianwu & B. Lihui, Variable Interest Entity Structure in China, China Law Insight (2012).  
4 D Barboza, A Loophole Poses Risks to Investors in Chinese Companies, N.Y. Times (2012) 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/a-loophole-poses-risks-to-investors-in-chinese-
companies. 
5 S. Lubman, supra p. 8. 
6 B. Naughton, supra p. 8. 
7 R. Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIEs, Forbes (2012) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-
chinesevies>accessed20/07/2015. 
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Oriental Education, and Alibaba.1 Today, nearly half of Chinese companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ use the VIE structure to sell stock to foreign 
investors in contravention of Chinese law.2  
 This is due to China’s new leaders being encouraged to choose a path of economic 
liberalism, in order to evade slowing or blocking the development model. Such an approach is 
exemplified by recent declarations made by Party officials; for example President Xi, who 
pledged that China would dedicate itself to constructing a ‘level playing field’ for all market 
players.3 Also, Premier Li introduced positive alterations to the restrictions placed upon foreign 
investments such as VIEs, and the year 2012 was the first time China’s banks extended a higher 
number of loans to private companies, than to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), both of which are 
encouraging for parties to VIEs.4 
 MOFCOM has the power to regulate foreign investment in China, and since such 
investing resumed in the early 1980s, the agency has exercised its power by restricting or 
prohibiting foreign investment in many industries5 It was MOFCOM’s broad restrictions on 
investment that would eventually prompt enterprising foreign investors to devise the illegal VIE 
workaround. Under MOFCOM’s rules, every financing or purchase of equity in a China-based 
company by a non-Chinese citizen is subject to governmental review and approval.6 The process 
is often a significant bureaucratic endeavor, with many agencies playing different roles in 
supervising foreign investments.7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 J. Eales, The Future of Chinese Foreign Investments: An Exploration of the Perils and 
Consequences of Investing in Variable Interest Entities, Kent S. L. Rev. (Volume 2, 2015). 
2 P. Gillis, Accounting Matters: Variable Interest Entities in China, 2 (2012) 
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie-2012septaccountingmatte.pdf. 
3 V. Ruan, Xi Jinping Pledges Level-Playing Field for Global Investors The South China 
Morning Post (2013) http:// www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1210311/xi-jinping-pledges-
level-playing-field-globalinvestors>accessed 05/05/2014. 
4 Shadows Lengthen: Chinese Credit Rises. China's Credit Rating Falls, The Economist (2013) 
http:// www.economist.com.hk/news/china/21576134-chinese-credit-rises-chinas-credit-rating-
fallsshadows-lengthen> accessed 28/04/2014. 
5 P. Gillis, supra p.11. 
6 K. Fisher & S. Smyth, U.S. Private Equity Investment in Emerging Economies, 12 J. Int’l Bus. 
& L. 223, 230 (2014). 7!Id. 
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 The process of getting any particular foreign investment enterprise approved may involve 
(depending on the industry) up to eight different types of approval, including: anti-monopoly 
approval, national security approval, enterprise registration, local site-related opinion letters, 
project approval, foreign investment approval, regulatory approval, and approval of strategic 
investment in a Chinese publicly traded company.1 The question for many foreign investors, 
however, is not whether they can navigate the myriad agencies involved in the various approval 
processes, but whether they are permitted to attempt the process at all.2 
 However, one must remain mindful that, in reality, these are comparatively small 
changes. The intermittent public quarrels between the different parties to the VIE arrangement 
and the unclear and often contradictory approaches of various regulatory bodies highlight the 
drawbacks that continue to plague the VIEs.3 Furthermore, the enduring lack of clarity, 
transparency and equality between the parties to the VIE structure, evidence that sincere shifts in 
policy of greater proportions is required in order to truly impact the perilous ambiguity rife 
within the structure.4 
 In spite of minor improvements in the attitudes of Chinese leadership, the fact that 
change is still needed is demonstrated by the rising uncertainty felt by the relevant parties as they 
are forced to continue operating upon the basis of speculation. This brings many to the 
conclusion that such legal ambiguity needs to be dealt with before China potentially jeopardizes 
the confidence of foreign investors in its economic markets and loses the key competitive status 
it requires in order to attract and retain foreign investors.5 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, China’s Approval Process For Inbound Foreign Direct 
Investment: Impact on Market Access, National Treatment and Transparency, 9–18 (2012), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/020021_Chi 
na_InboundInvestment_Cvr.pdf. 
2 B. Naughton, supra p. 8. 
3 M. Goldberger & L. Krabill, Fraud Prevalent in Reverse Merger Companies with Operations 
in China, Ballard Spahr LLP (2011) 
http://www.ballardspahr.com/AlertsPublications/Articles/2011-07- 
08_Fraud_Prevalent_in_Reverse_Merger_Companies_with_Operations_in_China. 
4 V. Lo & X. Tian, Law for Foreign Business and Investment in China, 364, Routledge (2009). 
5 S. Wei, supra p. 9. 
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 The term VIE was established following a change in what was considered a “controlling 
financial interest” for the purposes of determining when a parent is obligated to consolidate the 
financial statements of the subsidiary. The change occurred because there was a problem of 
parent companies altering their reported financial statements.1 Whether a company can 
consolidate a financial statement is important because consolidated financial statements allow a 
firm and all of its subsidiaries to combine their assets, equity, liabilities, and operating accounts 
and submit that information as if it belongs to a single company.2 
 Under Accounting Research Bulletin 51 the term “controlling financial interest” referred 
to one company owning more than half of the shares of another company.3  Financial Accounting 
Standards Boards Interpretation 46 the definition was expanded to include a parent company 
who is a primary beneficiary of the VIE. Primary beneficiary was defined as company who was 
entitled to both the gains and the losses of the other company.4 This mean that in the context of a 
VIE structure, consolidation of financial statements is possible if one entity is entitled to all of 
the gains and losses of the other entity, even if there is no direct equity stake, because that 
arrangement still qualifies as a controlling financial interest.5   
 The VIE structure also gives both the investor and the Chinese Operating Co. the 
advantage of being able to choose their forum for their listed entity, which is why most 
companies use the Cayman Islands since it has a very corporate-friendly regulatory structure. 
This allows the parties to avoid aspects of the regulatory structure in both the United States and 
China that could possibly result in increased regulation, as well as increased taxation if the entity 
were not situated in a corporate tax haven such as the Cayman Islands. This, of course, is not to 
say the companies completely avoid regulation by the governments of either China or the United 
States. There are still SEC obligations, for instance, if the shares of the offshore Listed Co. are 
listed on an exchange in the United States. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 L. Guo, Chinese Style VIEs: Continuing to Sneak under Smog? (2014) 47 Cornell International 
Law Journal 569, 572. 
2 Definition of Consolidated Financial Statement, BusinessDictionary.com, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/consolidated-financial-statement.html. 
3 Financial Accounting Standards Board, ARB No. 51: Consolidated Financial 
Statements (August 1959).!
4 Id. 
5 L. Guo, supra p. 13. 
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